THE LAW OF LIBEL-CONSTITUTIONAL
PRIVILEGE AND THE PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL:
ROUND TWO-GERTZ v. ROBERT WELCH, INC.

INTRODUCTION

Media defendants have been afforded a constitutional privilege
in libel actions since New York Times v. Sullivan.' The first
amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, has proved a
barrier to recovery for a large group of plaintiffs who, under Times,
must prove that the defendant published with actual knowledge
of the falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Subsequent cases
have expanded this first amendment protection and have delineated the quantum of proof needed by the plaintiff to override the
constitutional privilege. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.2 the Supreme Court broke new ground in interpreting Times and the role
of the first amendment as applied to the law of libel. The new
rule enunciated in the Gertz decision is that the Times standard
does not apply to private individuals. Now, in suits by private
plaintiffs, the states are free to impose, short of strict liability, the
appropriate burden that a private plaintiff must meet in order to
recover from a media defendant.3 Private plaintiffs, however, can
no longer rely on the common law advantage 4of presumed damages
unless they meet the rigorous Times standard.
The Court in Gertz overturned the plurality decision in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc., 5 which had allowed media defendants to
apply the Times rule against private plaintiffs involved in an area
of public interest.6 Since the Gertz holding applies to all private
plaintiffs whether or not involved in an area of public interest, it
is both an expansion and a limitation of the constitutional privilege.
Gertz is an expansion of the first amendment generally in that
private plaintiffs not involved in an area of public concern can no
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Id at 347.
Id. at 349.
403 U.S. 29 (1971).
Id. at 52.
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longer rely on the advantage of strict liability and presumed
damages; it is a limitation of the privilege as applied by Times
because private plaintiffs are relieved of the burden of proving constitutional malice. By overturning Rosenbloom, and limiting the
common law advantage that plaintiffs have in defamation actions,
the Supreme Court has created a new type of constitutional privilege applicable to private plaintiffs. This comment will examine
the cases leading up to Gertz and explore how the new privilege
will work against the Times rule to change the law of defamation,
CONSTrUTIONAL PRIVILEGE DENED Am EXPANDED

The Supreme Court created the constitutional privilege for media
defendants ten years before Gertz was decided. The Times case
arose when supporters of Martin Luther King ran an advertisement
in the New York Times to obtain support for a right to vote campaign. The advertisement claimed misconduct on the part of the
Montgomery city police. 7 Plaintiff, city police commissioner,
claimed he was libeled by the advertisement." The Supreme Court
granted certiorari after a jury verdict for the plaintiff had been
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Alabama.0 The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with "actual malice"--that is, with knowledge that it 0was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.'

The Court weighed the first amendment guarantees of freedom
of speech and press against a public official's interest in protecting
his reputation and concluded that the first amendment prohibited
recovery for negligently made falsehoods about a person in his
official capacity. The holding drew the constitutional dividing line
squarely in front of public officials, and required them to meet a
stringent standard of proof in order to recover from medial defendants. Prosser called this "the greatest victory won by defendants
in the modem history of the law of torts."" This victory was to
grow in scope over the next ten years until it received its first major
setback in the Gertz case.
Although Times was limited to public officials, sweeping dicta
in the case made significant expansion inevitable. The Court
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 257 (1964).
Id. at 258.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
376 U.S. at 279-80.
W. PiosSER, ToRTs 819 (4th ed. 1971).
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founded the privilege on "[tihe general proposition that freedom
of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment ....
1 2 The Court found "a profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open... ,,-s It seems inconsistent to have placed
so much emphasis on the public issues involved while limiting the
holding to "public officials." Certainly, the de-segregation problem
was a matter of wide public interest, but the Court was not yet
willing to extend the privilege past public officials, and thus decided
the case on a narrower ground although they soon expanded the
scope of the public official category. 14 The conflict between the
holding and rationale made an extension past public officials seem
imminent.15
The Supreme Court took the first significant step toward the expansion of the Times rule in the companion cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker.' 6 The Court held
7
that all "public figures" were to be included under the Times rule.'
In the first case, plaintiff Butts was the privately employed University of Georgia athletic director who was "well known and respected
in the coaching ranks.' 8 Butts was accused of trying to fix a
football game by the Saturday Evening Post. The second plaintiff,
Walker, was a "man of some political prominence"' 19 who was reported to have led a march against federal officers who were seeking to enforce a de-segregation decision. The Court decided that
both men were public figures and as such had to prove constitutional malice in order to recover. As in the Times decision the
Court used broad dicta to justify a narrower holding, stating:
12. 376 U.S. at 269.
13. Id. at 270.
14. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
15. The commentators saw the possibility of expansion, but were split
on whether this was desirable. See Note, Constitutional Law-First
Amendment Requires Qualified Privilege to Publish Defamatory Misstatements About Public Officials, 113 U. P=N. L. RPv. 284 (1964); Note, Con-

stitutional Law-Freedom of the Press-Libel--State Law Allowing Libel
Suit by Public Official Without Proof of Malice Held Unconstitutional, 42
TEXAs L. REv. 1080 (1964); Note, Privilege to Criticize Public Officials: A

ConstitutionalExtension, 38 So. CAL. L. REV. 349 (1965).
16. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). A pre-Curtis case reached the same result. See
Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 388 U.S. 909 (1967).

17. 388 U.S. at 155.
18. Id. at 136.

19. Id. at 140.

The dissemination of the individual's opinions on matters of
public interest is for us, in the historic words of the Declaration
of Independence, an 'unalienable
right that 'governments are insti20
tuted among men to secure.'

Because of this dicta, the public figure classification seemed to
be only a stopping point, and not the final resting place for the
constitutional privilege. At this point, however, the constitutional
dividing line in defamation actions was placed in front of public
officials and public figures, and at least theoretically, behind private
individuals. The Gertz case reinforced the importance of this
dividing line because public figures are still required to prove actual
malice, while private plaintiffs can recover actual damages on a less
stringent burden of proof.2 1 In order to invoke the Times rule and
avoid Gertz, defendants will argue that the particular plaintiff is
a public figure, while plaintiffs will insist they are private individuals.
Another pre-Rosenbloom case, Time, Inc. v. Hill,22 takes on added
significance in light of the Gertz decision. Plaintiff James Hill
brought an action under the New York right to privacy statute
claiming that Life Magazine had falsely portrayed a family experience which was made into a play.23 The Hill family had previously
been the subject of a front page news story when they were held
hostage by three convicts in their home. The Court held that a
plaintiff involved in an area of public interest could not recover
under the New York privacy statute without meeting the Times
standard of proof. 24 Following the trend of expansion under Times,
25
the Hill decision seemed inevitable.
The Court again used broad dicta to justify such a holding limited
to invasion of privacy actions, stating:
The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of
political expression or comment26upon public affairs essential as
those are to healthy government.

As will be expained, the Hill case takes on added significance
under Gertz for the private plaintiff who has an area of his private
20. Id. at 149. As will be seen, the lower courts picked up on his dicta
to justify an extension of Times, before Rosenbloom was decided.
21. The court in Gertz left the question of liability to the states, but they
strongly implied a negligence standard. 418 U.S. at 348.
22. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
23. Id. at 376-77.
24. Id. at 387-88.
25. Cf. Note, Constitutional Law-Privileges From Libel-New York
Times v. Sullivan Defined or Shackled?, 21 DE PAuL L. REv. 248 (1968)
(arguing that since Times was person oriented, Hill was a break with precedent being event oriented).
26. 385 U.S. at 388.
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life opened up to the public. In some circumstances he may be
forced to by-pass a defamation action and bring an invasion of
privacy suit having to contend with the Hill barrier.
While the category of plaintiffs covered by Times expanded, the
standard of proof various plaintiffs were required to meet remained
relatively stable. To prove constitutional malice, the plaintiff had
to show that the false statements were made with a "high degree
of awareness of their probable falsity."27 The Court stated that
mere ill will was not enough if the defendant did not know what
he was publishing was false. 28 Public officials and public figures
had to meet the same standard of proof.29 What the plaintiff really
had to prove was "scienter", 30 but the Court nevertheless retained
the term "malice" to denote the unprotected class of calculated
falsehoods.
Few plaintiffs have been able to meet the constitutional burden,
even in response to a motion for summary judgment by the defendant. 31 The plaintiff in Curtis met the necessary standard because

of "serious deficiencies in investigatory procedure." 32 The information on which the article was written was gained from an insurance salesman who claimed to have overheard a phone conversation

in which the plaintiff was seeking to fix a football game. Despite
adequate time to investigate since this was not "hot news," nothing
was done to verify the report.33 Barry Goldwater was allowed to
recover against a magazine which accused him of being mentally
ill. There was substantial evidence that the defendant had falsified

letters and reports in order to malign Goldwater's reputation. 34 In
27. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
28. Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965).
29. Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11
(1970). This result was in doubt because Curtis had applied what seemed
to be a gross negligence test to public figures. See Curtis v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130, 155 (1967).
30. PROSSER, supranote 11, at 821.
31. See, e.g., Firestone v. Time, Inc., 460 F.2d 712 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 875 (1972); Hensley v. Life Magazine, Time, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 50
(N.D. Cal. 1971).
32. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 157 (1967).

33. Id. This would seem to contradict the statement made in Times that
investigatory failure is not sufficient to justify malice. New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287 (1964).
34. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1049 (1970). See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 95 S. Ct. 465,
470 (1975) (malice found in an invasion of privacy action).

order to recover, most plaintiffs had to place themselves in a constitutionally excluded category; the malice standard proved to be
a virtual bar to those who could not.
THE LAST EXPANSioN OF TimesTHE PuBic In
sT TEST

In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc.,3 5 the Supreme Court applied
the Times rule against a plaintiff who was neither a public official
nor a public figure. Plaintiff was a previously obsure citizen who
was arrested for selling obscene literature. After being acquitted
of criminal charges, Rosenbloom brought a diversity action against
a local radio station claiming that their news reports about his
arrest were libelous. 0 The trial court sustained an award for
plaintiff.3 7 This recovery was unusual. By this time, lower courts
had seized on the dicta in preceding Supreme Court cases and had
held that any plaintiff involved in an area of public concern had
to prove constitutional malice in order to recover. Following this
trend, the appellate court reversed, holding that "the First Amendment standard of actual malice is applicable to the case ....188
although Rosenbloom clearly was not a public figure.
Before the Supreme Court had decided to expand Times to all
areas of public interest, lower courts had indicated an assumption
that such was a logical extension. 89 Furthermore, lower courts
were not content with a narrow definition of public interest, choosing to interpret the term broadly. For example, an article degrading a hotel used by patrons of the Masters Golf Tournament was
considered of sufficient public interest to warrant constitutional
protection.4 0 A high school basketball recruiter had to prove actual
malice when he was called a "flesh peddler," because the sport itself
had public appeal. 4 1 The operation of a mail order distributor,42
the Mafia,4 3 and a duffer's errant golf shot 44 have been considered
35. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
36. 289 F. Supp. 737, 742 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
37. Id.
38. 415 F.2d 892, 898 (3d Cir. 1969).
39. See Comment, Further Limits on Libel Actions-Extension of the
New York Times Rule to Libels Arising From Discussion of "Public Issues,"
16 Vni.. L. REv.955 (1971).
40. Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970).
41. Garkinkel v. Twenty-First Century Publishing Co., 30 App. Div. 787,
N.Y.S.2d 735 (1968).
42. United Medical Laboratories Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System
Inc., 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969).
43. Ragano v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1005 (M.D. Fla. 1969), aff'd, 427
F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1970); Holmes v. Curtis Publishing Co., 303 F. Supp. 522
(D.S.C. 1969).
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of sufficient public interest to command constitutional protection.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that part of the state's constitution
violated the first amendment because it required a defendant to
prove good motives in order to escape liability in a defamation
action.4 5 Before Rosenbloom was decided, the trial court in Gertz
entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant
because the private plaintiff, Gertz, was involved in an area of
public interest and could not prove malice.4 6
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court's determination of
plaintiff Rosenbloom's action seemed certain. It was not. Only a
plurality was able to agree that a private individual involved in
a public event had to prove malice in order to recover from a media
defendant. 47 The opinion, written -by Justice Brennan and joined
in by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, indicated that
the important consideration to them was the nature of the event,
not the particular person involved. The plurality said that
[ilf a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because ... in some sense
48 the in-

dividual did not "voluntarily" choose to become involved.

Because of such an assumption, the plurality decision expressly
rejected the arguments which were to become the framework of
the Gertz decision. The plaintiff argued that he was more deserving of recovery than a public official or public figure because he
had not thrust himself into the public eye, and had no means of
rebutting the defamatory falsehood. 49 The Court decided that such
assertions could not "be reconciled with the purpose of the First
Amendment, with our cases, and with the traditional doctrine o
libel law itself.""" The plaintiff sought to establish liability based
on negligence with the necessity of proof of actual damages. The
44. Sellers v. Time, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 423 F.2d
887 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830 (1970).
45. Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 25& N.E.2d 408 (1969) (invalidating ILL. CoxsT. art. II, § 4 (1870) insofar as it was inconsistent with
Times).
46. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997, 100D (N.D. Ill. 1970).
47. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971).
48. Id. at 43.
49. Id. at 45. Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392
(1969) (in case of personal attack, television station must offer reply time).
50. 403 U.S. at 45. See generally Comment, The Expanding Constitutional Protectionfor the News Media from Liability for Defamation: Predictability and the New Synthesis, 70 McH. L. Rv. 1547 (1972).

Court rejected the negligence standard because it would "inevitably
cause self-censorship," 5' and a limitation to actual damages without
Amendment insufficient
the Times standard would leave "the First
52
elbow room within which to function."
Justice Black and Justice White concurred in the judgment, but
for different reasons. Justice Black expressed the view that the
first amendment prohibits "recovery of libel judgments against the
news media even when statements are broadcast with knowledge
they are false."53 Justice White argued that the constitutional
privilege should only extend to a full report of official activities,
including private individuals if necessary. The official action in
Rosenbloom was the arrest of the plaintiff. Because of this official
action, Justice White would require plaintiff to meet the Times test;
he did not interpret Times to require a full extension to all matters
of public interest.5"
The dissents of Justices Harlan, Marshall, and Stewart were significant because of their particularly strong opposition to the basic
assumptions espoused by the plurality. They agreed with the
plaintiff's argument that liabilility should be based on a showing
of negligence with a limitation of recovery to actual damages. 5
Justice Harlan, however, argued for allowing punitive damages,
while Justices Marshall and Stewart sought to have them abolished. 56 Justice Marshall and Justice Stewart were to become part
of the majority in Gertz which upset the Rosenbloom plurality.
Despite the fact that the plurality decision legitimized an extension of the Times rule to all areas of public interest, two countervailing considerations should be noted. First, the plurality decision
was not binding on the lower courts. 57 The second consideration
is an important caveat by the Court:
We expressly leave open the question of what constitutional standard of proof, if any, controls the enforcement of state libel laws
for defamatory falsehoods published or broadcast by news media
51. 403 U.S. at 50.
52. Id. at 52.
53. Id. at 57. Justice Douglas did not take part in the decision, but he
probably would have agreed with Justice Black. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 267 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
54. 403 U.S. at 57.
55. Id. at 64 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 78 (Marshall and Stewart, J.J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 78 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 84 (Marshall and Stewart, J.J., dissenting).
57. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1941) (non-majority decision is not binding precedent); Note, MisinterpretingThe Supreme Court:
An Analysis of How the ConstitutionalPrivilege to Defame Has Been Incorrectly Expanded, 10 InAHo L. REv. 212 (1972).
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about a person's activities not within the area of public or general
58

interest.

The lower courts ignored these signposts. The mere fact that the
Supreme Court was unable to muster a majority on a constitutional
extension when the facts of the case clearly dealt with a matter
of public interest should have caused the lower courts to reexamine
their broad interpretation of the Times rule. They did not. An
explosion of the public interest category occurred as if required by
Rosenbloom. 59 Particularly striking was Kent v. Pittsburg Press
Co.,60 in which case a reporter examining a state prison saw plaintiff in the prison waiting room. The reporter assumed that the
plaintiff was guilty of murder, although criminal charges against
the plaintiff had been dropped after a long period of incarceration.
The court refused to look at the status of the plaintiff; recovery
was denied because prison conditions in general were a matter of
public interest and the plaintiff was involved in these conditions
even though he was being released. 6 1
The public interest category was broad, but was not all-inclusive;
at times courts would recognize that an event was outside the area
of public interest. 62 There was a serious problem, however, with
formulating meaningful guidelines. Some cases which seemed to
involve an event of some public interest were excluded from the
Times test, while other cases which seemed to deal with private
affairs were deemed covered by constitutional privilege. 63 Such a
situation is more than the changing manifestation of the rule as
58. 403 U.S. at 44 n.12.
59. See, e.g., Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 154 (D.
Mont. 1973) (alleged cure for arthritis); Gospel Spreading Church v. Johnson Publishing Co., 454 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (activities of tax exempt
church); Firestone v. Time, Inc., 460 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1972) (electronic
eavesdropping); Gallman v. Carnes, 254 Ark. 987, 497 S.W.2d 47 (1973)
(credentials of law school dean).
60. 349 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
61. Id. at 627.
62. See, e.g., Brown v. First National Bank of Mason City, 193 N.W.2d
547 (Iowa 1972) (disappearance of small amounts of money at local bank);
Hood v. Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 985 (1974) (credit report of small business).
63. See Sanders v. Harris, 213 Va. 369, 192 S.E.2d 754 (1972) (private
dispute between English professors was a matter of public interest); but
see Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745 (1972) (divorce of prominent

socialite held not a matter of public interest even though she had spoken
to the press on the matter).

applied in different jurisdictions; it is an example of the unsoundness of the rule itself.
The problem with the public interest test is that the defendant
could almost always escape liability by a broad framing of the issue
or title of the article or press release. In close cases what the
publisher called the article was usually decisive. For example, the
activities of a disillusioned college graduate in Crete certainly is
not a matter of public interest in the United States. However, if
Life Magazine publishes an article about "Young American Nomads
Abroad," the issue suddenly becomes one of public interest."4 A
landlord's eviction of a tenant is not a matter of public interest
unless the defendant can show that the article about the event was
really on substandard housing. Then he can publish with impunity. 5 The subject of organized crime is a matter of public interest;
thus anyone accused of involvement must meet the Times test.00
The article which libeled Elmer Gertz was a personal attack on
Gertz and his client. In the lower courts, the defendant escaped
liability because he was able to convince the court that the subject
of the article was really more broad, i.e., a communist war on police.
Few remarks can be as damaging to reputation as an accusation
7
of criminal conduct, yet these statements are usually privileged.
The Gertz decision was based on the assumption "1... of the legit-

imate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation .... "I's Arguably the Supreme Court
has implied an interest which the state courts have not recognized. The state courts, and the lower federal courts applying
state law, have been less than aggressive in restricting Rosenbloom
and the range of the public interest test.0 9 If the lower courts had
been more concerned with compensating plaintiffs for damage to
reputation, they could have limited the public interest test where
appropriate, so that the plaintiff could at least bring his case to
trial rather than losing on summary judgment.
The public interest test laid down in Rosenbloom became overly
broad as applied in the lower courts. It became clear that the media
could fabricate their own privilege; most anything they published
became a matter of public interest because of the publication.
64. Goldman v. Time, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
65. Harnish v. Herald-Mail Co., 264 Md. 326, 286 A.2d 146 (1972).
66. See Casano v. WDSU-TV Inc., 464 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1972); LaBruzzo
v. Associated Press, 353 F. Supp. 979 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
67. See Porter v. Guam Publications, Inc., 475 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1973);
Miller v. News Syndicate Co., 445 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1971).
68. 418 U.S. at 348-49.
69. See Comment, supra note 58, at 213.
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Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.-A NEw DEPARTURE
In 1968 Frank Nuccio, a Chicago policeman, shot and killed Ronald
Nelson while on duty. Frank Nuccio was convicted of murder in
the second degree. Ronald Nelson's family brought a civil action
against Nuccio retaining Elmer Gertz as counsel. The John Birch
Society's magazine editor sent Alan Stang to investigate the matter.
Stang published his findings in the April 1969 issue of American
Opinion in the article, "Frame Up-Richard Nuccio and the War
on Police." Elmer Gertz played no part in the criminal proceeding
and did not discuss the issue with the press.7 0 Nevertheless, Alan
Stang implicated Elmer Gertz as being part of a nationwide communist conspiracy to discredit local police. The article falsely accused Gertz of being
an official of the Marxist League of Industrial Democracy,
originally known as the Intercollegiate Socialist Society, which has
advocated the violent seizure of our government7
...

Elmer Gertz was also labeled a "Communist Fronter" and a
"Leninist" by the article. He was accused of being an officer in
the Communist National Lawyers Guild, which allegedly caused the
disruption of the Democratic National Convention.7 2

These statements at best "contained serious inaccuracies.173 Gertz
is a prominent Chicago attorney who had never been a member of
the Marxist League. He brought a diversity libel action in United
States District Court against Robert Welch Inc., the publisher of
American Opinion34 The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff
which was vacated when the defendant successfully moved for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The district court said that
"[t]he penumbra of First Amendment protection falls .

.

. on ...

Gertz. 17 5 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that Gertz was
probably a public figure, but went on to decide on public interest
grounds.7 6

The appellate court, bolstered by the recent Rosen-

bloom decision, affirmed finding a "significant public interest in the
subject matter of the article." 77
70. 418 U.S. at 326.

71, Aia=css= OPINION, April 1969, at 5.

72. 418 U.S. at 326.
73. Id.

74. 322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
75. Id. at 1000.
76. 471 F.2d 801, 805 (7th Cir. 1972).
77. Id.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and the majority decision
written by Justice Powell took a new approach to the problems
of who is covered by the constitutional privilege, and what a plaintiff must do to overcome the protected person's privilege. The
Court considered a broader range of defamed plaintiffs in framing
the issue:
The principle issue in this case is whether a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory falsehoods about an individual
who is neither a public official nor a public figure may claim a
constitutional privilege
against liability for the injury inflicted by
8
those statementsj
There was no specific mention of private plaintiffs involved in an
area of public interest. By implication, the Court showed that it
was going to consider the issue of constitutional privilege as applied
to all private plaintiffs. The wider scope of the issue was carried
into the holding:
We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault,
the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of
liability for a publisher or broadcaster
of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.1 9
The Court adopted the reasoning that was rejected in Rosenbloom
to justify their Gertz holding. In balancing a state's interest in
compensating libeled plaintiffs against the first amendment guarantees of free press and speech, the Court found that the scales
tipped in favor of redress for the private individual.80 While the
first amendment requirements remain stable with all plaintiffs,
the Court reasoned that the state's interest increases with private
plaintiffs because they have no practical self-help remedy and have
not exposed themselves to public criticism.8 1 For such reasons, it
seemed patently unfair to require private plaintiffs to meet the
same standard of proof as public officials and public figures.
The Court expressly abandoned the "public interest" test set
down in Rosenbloom,8 2 and recognized only three categories of defamation plaintiffs: private persons, public figures, and public officials. Because under Rosenbloom a private plaintiff not involved
in an area of public concern was not required to meet any constitutional standard, such a distribution of plaintiffs created a further
extension of the first amendment into the law of defamation, even
though courts have defined the private plaintiff category narrowly.
78. 418 U.S. at 332.
79. Id. at 347.
80. Id. at 343.

81. Id. at 344-45.
82. Id. at 346.
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Before Gertz, a purely private plaintiff could rely on strict liability 83
and presumed damages where the publication was defamatory on its
face. 84 While Gertz expanded first amendment protection, it also
limited the Times rule because a private plaintiff involved in an
area of general concern is now relieved of the burden of proving
constitutional malice. Thus private plaintiffs not involved in an
area of public concern must prove more to recover; private plaintiffs involved in an area of public interest, as defined by Rosenbloom, need prove less.
While private plaintiffs need only prove some degree of fault as
determined by the particular state, the standard of proof required
of public officials and public figures remains unchanged by Gertz.
Because of the distinction, a major battle area will occur in future
cases as plaintiffs argue that they fall under Gertz, and defendants
insist that the plaintiff is a public figure. The Supreme Court provided some helpful guidelines for future determination of plaintiff
status.
The public figure classification, as defined by Curtis, has been
broken into two subcategories. A general public figure is one who
has achieved "such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes
a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. '8 5 To have
the plaintiff included, the defendant must show "clear evidence of
general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society
. ,"816 Such a burden will
probably assure that the category of public officials is not expanded
like the public interest test under Rosenbloom. Gertz was not included in this class because mere involvement in community and
professional affairs was not sufficient to classify a plaintiff as a
87
public figure for all purposes.
In a second and more specialized class is the individual who
"voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range
of issues."881 At first blush it would seem that Gertz would meet
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

PaOSSER, supra note 11, at 771.
Id. at 763.
418 U.S. at 351.
Id. at 352.
Id.
Id. at 351.

this test because he brought a civil action based on a highly publicized murder trial. The Supreme Court, however, interpreted the
category more narrowly than the old public interest test, holding
that Gertz fell out of its 'bounds because, "[h]e plainly did not
thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor did he engage
the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome."80
Evidently mere involvement in an area of public interest is not
enough to get placed in the class; probably the plaintiff must distinguish himself within the area of the controversy.
The Gertz case has changed the basis of liability in defamation
actions by private individuals. Under Timee, the common law rule
of strict liability"0 remained unchanged, although the plaintiff still
had to show malice. Gertz has traded an abandonment of the
strict liability rule for the malice standard under Times.0 ' The
Court did not say what the proper basis of liability should be, but
they strongly implied a negligence standard.
Our inquiry would involve considerations somewhat different from
those discussed above if a State purported to condition civil
liability on a factual misstatement whose content did not warn a
reasonably
prudent editor or broadcaster of its defamatory poten92
tiaL.

If negligence is going to be the standard, the plaintiff may still
have a difficult time recovering especially if the defamatory statement came from a press release which a reasonably prudent editor
would not have inspected. Breach of duty may be hard to prove
in many cases when the burden of prevention is great in relation
to the risk that an innocent looking statement is defamatory, but
the plaintiff is given a better chance under Gertz to get his case
to the jury.
The common law recognized an exception to the strict liability
standard for distributors of defamatory material. 3 A distributor
was held liable only if he breached the normal negligence standards.
This breach was hard to establish because he was not held to a
duty to inspect all of the publications which he distributed. Arguably a publisher who receives information from an independent
third party is acting as a distributor, but courts have not recognized
this similarity. 4 Despite the strict standards that publishers have
-- 89 -Id.-

352.

. . ...........-.

90. PnossER, supra note 11, at 771.
91. 418 U.S. at 347.
92. Id. at 348. See also Chief Justice Burger's dissent at 355.

93. PnossER, supra note 11, at 773.
94. See, e.g., Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909) (ad showing plaintiff, who did not drink, endorsing whiskey); Szalay v. New York American
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generally been held to, there has been a constant undercurrent
against strict liability for the publisher especially when he could
not have known the statement was false.2 5 One court refused to
apply strict liability against a publisher who received reliable information from a trustworthy news service.20 Commentators have
long argued that strict liability in defamation actions is inconsistent
with modern tort concepts of fault.9 7 Although the general rule
has been to hold a defendant strictly liable, the Supreme Court's
adoption of a negligence standard in defamation actions by private
plaintiffs is neither a radical departure from tort law in general
nor defamation law in particular.98
Along with proving liability based on negligence comes the necessity of proving actual damages. Most courts have held that when
a defamatory statement is apparent on the face of a publication,.
the plaintiff need not prove actual damage in order to recover.
Damages are generally presumed from the fact of the publication
itself. Under Gertz, the rule has changed for private plaintiffs
bringing a cause of action against media defendants. The private
plaintiff must either prove actual damages or meet the Times standard. In the balance between recovery for libel and the first
amendment, the states only have an interest in compensating for
actual injury. The Court said:
[W]e hold that the states may not permit recovery of presumed
or punitive damages, at least when liability iq not based on a
showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth.99
Because of the first amendment,
[i]t is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove
Inc., 254 App. Div. 249, 4 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1938) (publisher held to strict liability in report of marital misconduct gained from reliable news agency).
95. See, e.g., Memphis Commercial Appeal, Inc. v. Johnson, 96 F.2d 672
(6th Cir. 1938); Summit Hotel Co. v. National, Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa.
182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939) (refusal to extend strict liability where it would be
unjust).
96. Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234 (1933).
97. See, e.g., Note, Negligence in the Law of Defamation, 29 HAnv. L. REV.
533 (1916); Note, Liability for Defamatory Words Intending to Apply to
Another Person but Reasonably Applicable to the Plaintiff, 38 HARv. L. REv.
1100 (1925).
98. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
99. 418 U.S. at 349.

knowledge of falstiy or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual injury. 00
"[A]wards must be supported by competent evidence concerning
the injury, although there need be no evidence which assigns an
actual dollar value to the injury.'' 1 1 Thus the private defamation
plaintiff has two avenues of relief. He can attempt to prove constitutional malice or he can introduce evidence to show that the
libelous statement injured him.
The requirement of actual damages is a logical outgrowth of a
negligence cause of action; the law of presumed damages has come
under fire. 10 2 In the labor relations field, the Supreme Court has
already recognized the need for proof of actual damages in defamation actions. 10 3 Some plaintiffs will undoubtedly not be able to
prove enough actual damages to make their action worthwhile. Inability to prove damages may reflect more than just the particular
plaintiff's problems of finding competent evidence. The faot may
be that there is no evidence available. The inability to prove
damages may reflect the fact that the plaintiff's reputation has not
been injured. Huge presumed damage awards may have been based
on the assumption that the larger the publication, the greater the
damage to reputation. Just the opposite conclusion should be
reached in cases where the defamatory matter has been published
so far from the plaintiff that his reputation could not have been
injured in any meaningful way. Thus, when a plaintiff is unable
to prove actual damages, he may be proving how absurd presumed
damages were in the first place.
First amendment guarantees make limiting the size of recovery
sensible in order to prevent self-censorship by the media. Allowing
the private plaintiff the advantage of presumed damages when the
defendant has acted maliciously seems ill-advised. The frame of
mind of the defendant does not effect the injury to the plaintiff's
reputation. Most cases hold that the good faith of the defendant
only has a bearing on punitive damages. 0 4 Some cases have allowed a greater recovery of actual damages because of the malice
of the defendant, but because of increased injury to the plaintiff's
100. Id.

101. Id. at 350. It seems the Court is ab-'ndoning its own goal here. i.e.,
ending supervision of the lower courts by ad hoc balancing.

Id. at 343.

102. See Arkin and Granquist, The Presumption of General Damages in
the Law of ConstitutionalLibel, 68 COLum. L. REv. 1482 (1968); Murnaghan,
From Figment to Fiction to Philosophy-The Requirement of Proof of Actual Damages in Libel Actions, 22 CATHOLIc U.L. Ray. 1 (1972).
103. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, 383 U.S. 53, 86
(1965) (Times applied by analogy).
104. C. McCoMoicK, DAMAGRS 435 (1935); D. DOBBs, REMEDIES 519 (1973).
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feelings not because of greater damage to reputation.'0 5 When the
damage to reputation is the same, it seems illogical to allow one
plaintiff the advantage of presumed damages, while the other must
10 6
show an injury "by competent evidence."
The Gertz majority also restricted the award of punitive damages
to plaintiffs who can meet the Times test. 0 7 Since Gertz added
the Times standard to the common law requirement for the recovery of punitive damages, a private plaintiff must prove ill will
or intent to do harm in the traditional sense,1° 8 and the fact that
the defendant had knowledge of or recklessly disregarded the falsity. These categories are not mutually exclusive. A plaintiff who
can sustain the heavy burden of proving constitutional malice
should have little trouble showing traditional malice. However, the
higher standard should significantly reduce the number of punitive
damage awards, considering how difficult the Times standard has
been to meet in the past. Without easily obtainable punitive
damages, the Gertz victory could be a hollow one for private plaintiffs. In terms of reducing self-censorship, the limitation of punitive
damages has a far reaching effect. Publishers will be relieved of
the fear of having their conduct punished by awards of punitive
damages which are often much higher in cost than awards for
actual injuries.
Probably because the Court was dealing with a basis of liability
that was expected to be developed by the states themselves, they
refused to exercise the right of de novo review of the facts which
they had invoked in dealing wit) first amendment questions,'0 9
and remanded.
Justice Blackmun cast an important vote when he abandoned
his position taken in Rosenbloom and concurred with the majority
in Gertz.110 He changed his position in order to create a majority
decision and because he believed that the limitation of presumed
and punitive damages removed the possibility of self-censorship."'
105. See, e.g., Cook v. Patterson Drug Co., 185 Va. 516, 39 S.E.2d 304
(1946); Farrar v. Tribune Publishing Co., 57 Wash. 549, 358 P.2d 792 (1961).
106. 418 U.S. at 350.
107. Id.
108. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 9-10.
109. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964).
110. 418 U.S. at 353.
111. Id. at 354.

Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, stated he would reinstate the
jury verdict for the plaintiff on the narrow grounds that the right
to counsel requires a strong public policy against invidious identification of a lawyer with his client. 112 Justice Douglas dissented
and remained consistent with his absolutist view that there is no
constitutional leeway for any recovery in libel actions against media
defendants. 113 Justice Brennan also dissented, remaining faithful
to his opinion in Rosenbloom. He continued to find the negligence
amendment guarantees,
standard too flexible to protect the first
4
regardless of the status of the plaintiff."
Justice White also entered a dissent, arguing that private individuals should not be constrained by any constitutional limitations
in recovering from media defendants and that liability without
fault should be retained. 1 5 Justice White found no real threat to
the media from libel actions brought against them by private plaintiffs. ' 16 Thus he would not destroy the doctrine of presumed
damages or require that the plaintiff meet a constitutional standard
in order to win punitive damages. Justice White's dissent is consistent with his concurring opinion in Rosenbloom because in Gertz,
as opposed to Rosenbloom, there was no official action to tie the
plaintiff to the Times rule. Like Chief Justice Burger, Justice
White would reinstate the jury verdict for the plaintiff and reverse
the court of appeals.
TNvASIoN OF PRIVAcY AS

AN

ALTERNATIVE

A private individual who is not involved in an area of pulic interest has been swept into the realm of constitutional privilege by
Gertz. If a private plaintiff is unable to prove negligence and
actual damages, or constitutional malice, he will not be able to recover in a defamation action against a media defendant. He may,
however, recover in an invasion of privacy action If the public interest test is not over-expanded.
Time, Inc. v. Hill brought one aspect of invasion of privacy actions
under the first amendment, holding that matters of public interest
are covered by the Times rule.1 7 The Court in Hill expressly excluded areas outside of the public interest.
This limitation to newsworthy persons and events does not of
course foreclose an interpretation of the statute to allow damages

112. Id.

113. Id. at 355.

114. Id. at 361.

115. Id. at 369.
116. Id. at 396.

117. 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967).
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where "Revelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view
of the victim's position as to outrage the community's notions of
decency." [citations omitted] This case presents no question
whether truthful
publication of such matter could be constitutionally proscribed.118

Thus, the public interest test established by Rosenbloom, when
applied to invasion of privacy actions, remains in a different form
even after Gertz. A private plaintiff unable to prove the Gertz
requirements could recover in an invasion of privacy action if something about his private life were published, because he would not
be required to show negligence or actual damages. 119 Lower courts
have recognized that Hill is inapplicable to a plaintiff not involved
in an area of public interest. 12 0 However, as it was under Rosenbloom, public interest has been an expansive concept. One court
held that a story about the poverty of a family whose father had
died in a bridge accident eleven months earlier was a matter of
public interest.12
In light of Gertz, courts should restrict the ambiance given to
the public interest test in order to permit recovery when private
matters have been invaded. 22 Hopefully the expansion of the
public interest test which took place under Rosenbloom will not
be repeated.
CONCLUSION

There are at least two explanations for the Supreme Court's retreating from the extension that occurred under Times. One reason
is the change in the membership of the Court. Justices Powell and
Rehnquist have replaced Justices Black and Harlan. The former
pair sided with the majority in Gertz, while Black would have
almost certainly dissented. The other reason is less concrete.
118. Id. at 383 n.7.
119. PRossER, supranote 11, at 814.
120. See Taggart v. Wadleigh-Maurice Ltd., 489 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1973)
(plaintiff filmed emptying latrines); Briscoe v. Readers Digest Ass'n Inc.,
4 Cal. 3d 529, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34 (1971) (article about how plaintiff hi-jacked a truck eleven years earlier).
121. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 484 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1973),
rev'd on other grounds, 95 S. Ct. 465 (1975). The Court implied that a
Gertz-type analysis may soon be applied to invasion of privacy actions. Id.
at 469.
122. See generally Ninuner, The Right to Speak From Times to Time:
First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56
CAL. L. REv. 935, 959 (1968).

Under Rosenbloom, the lower courts over-extended Times with the
implied acquiescence of the Supreme Court. Once public interest
was set as the constitutional test, an outward expansion was inevitable. The Supreme Court has always recognized the importance of
allowing plaintiffs to protect their reputation. If this were not true,
they would have long ago embraced the absolutist views of Justices
Black and Douglas.
Gertz is an equitable solution to the conflict between the first
.amendment and a private plaintiff's interest in his reputation. It
remains to be seen, however, if private individuals have really
gained anything, considering the new burden of proving fault and
damages, coupled with the limitation on punitive damages. At least
under Gertz the private plaintiff has a better chance of getting his
case to the jury than he did under Rosenbloom. The new standards
may cause some self-censorship, but publishers need not worry
about an explosion of libel suits against them. The restriction of
punitive damages alone will probably keep many potential plaintiffs
from bringing a cause of action. To be consistent, the Court should
have followed through and totally eliminated presumed damages
for private individuals. Finally, since Gertz has expanded the
reach of the first amendment over plaintiffs not involved in any
public activity, the Supreme Court should recognize the legitimate
purpose served by an invasion of privacy action, and limit the probable growth of the public interest category in that area.
MATTHEW HERRON

